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Abstract 
 
This paper advances a resource mobilization perspective on the 2011-2012 electoral protests 
in Senegal. Motivational explanations, in the form of grievance accounts, have already been 
used to explain successful protest mobilization in this case. Yet here, the emphasis is placed 
on the intensive industry behind protest actions, demonstrating that mobilization must also be 
practically feasible. This requires prior networks and key actors who are willing to invest 
substantial financial and human resources in the organization of protests. In Senegal, this role 
was to an important extent taken up by political actors, following own power-attainment goals. 
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1. Introduction 
In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012 in Senegal, widespread protests took place 
against then-President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempts to change electoral rules in his favour. As 
several African leaders have done before him (see e.g. Posner & Young, 2007), the incumbent 
president tried to secure a third term in office when nearing the end of his presidency. He 
introduced a new legislative proposal to adjust the required majority to win the election in the 
first round, and put forward a new interpretation of the constitution to allow for his third term. 
The first strategy was thwarted by large-scale protests before the National Assembly on June 
23 2011, the day of the legislative vote. Despite further protests, Wade did participate in the 
presidential elections of February 2012. After Wade’s victory in the first round of the election, 
the opposition rallied behind runner-up Macky Sall, who eventually won the elections in March. 
Unlike some African leaders, Wade accepted his defeat and left office peacefully. 
 
It is quite common in the literature to explain mass mobilization by referring to individual or 
group motivations such as political and economic grievances (e.g. Gurr, 1974). In the case of 
the Senegalese electoral protests as well, the grievance explanation has been given most 
attention. Several researchers have for example already referred to rising civic consciousness 
among the Senegalese population (e.g. Gellar, 2013), as well as economic hardship and 
(youth) unemployment (e.g. Resnick, 2013). The latter cause has also been prominently 
featured by Western news media, which quickly link youth unemployment to violent rioting (e.g. 
BBC, 2012; Nossiter, 2012) - particularly in images (e.g. BBC, 2011). Lastly, movement 
activists themselves also tend to refer to the ‘will of the people’ when explaining their success 
in mobilizing the masses, often framing protests as spontaneous outbursts (Polletta, 2006). 
 
This paper, however, will emphasize additional conditions for successful mobilization, in 
particular the practical feasibility of mobilization. The theoretical frame is based on social 
movement studies, in which a motivational or grievance-based approach constitutes only one 
major dimension to explain movement successes (for an overview, see McAdam, McCarthy & 
Zald, 1988). Two other major dimensions in social movement studies focus on resource 
mobilization and political opportunity structures. Influenced by the work of Olson (1971) on 
collective action challenges, the resource mobilization perspective was advanced by McCarthy 
& Zald (1977) to raise attention to the importance of access to resources and minimal forms of 
organization for engagement in social conflict. Linked to this approach is a focus on the 
existence of prior formal and informal networks as a resource conducive to mobilization (Diani 
& McAdam, 2003; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988). Political opportunity structures (POS) 
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can be regarded as resources external to a group (Tarrow, 2002, p. 77-85). Several factors 
have been advanced as determining opportunities: e.g. access to the system, the (in)stability 
of political alignments, divided elites, influential allies, state strength (weak/strong), 
inclusive/exclusive state strategies, and repression.1 
 
Although the presence of political opportunity structures will also be addressed here, the major 
focus of this study is inspired by the resource mobilization approach. Studies making use of 
the different insights from social movement theory are not often undertaken with regard to 
protest mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. As will be argued here, going beyond grievances 
to emphasize the practical feasibility of protest mobilization can be of specific importance for 
this region as it greatly increases our understanding of what it means to stage protests in a 
developing context. The approach requires an in-depth empirical investigation of internal 
movement workings and decisions, which is primarily based on interviews conducted with 
protest organizers in Dakar2. 
 
By emphasizing organizational networks and strategic actor decisions I will highlight the 
intensive industry behind protest mobilization and nuance aspects of the motivational 
explanations for the Senegalese electoral protests as described above. The role of political 
parties and their youth movements in organizing (violent) protests will be particularly stressed 
and the respective mobilization capacities of political parties and la société civil’3 in Senegal 
                                               
1 One major critique of the POS approached can be found in Meyer (2004, p. 135): “In seeking to 
examine the exogenous factors that could affect the development of a social movement, analysts 
accrete new variables they judge to be significant in the case under examination. […] Thus, 
opportunity variables are often not disproved, refined, or replaced, but simply added.” Consequently, a 
whole range of possible POS variables exist in the literature. 
2 Field visits were undertaken in February/March 2014, and November/December 2014. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with leaders and organizers of the ‘Mouvement 23’, as well as key observers 
of the movement (e.g. civil society members who did not take part in the M23). In total, 32 interviews 
were conducted. In addition, 3 interviews were conducted with high-ranking members of the PDS. 
During my visits it was also possible to acquire internal movement documents which are used in the 
analysis. An additional source of information is formed by 35 informal interviews with local residents, 
politicians, and youth movements in the neighbourhoods around one of the central protesting squares, 
the Place de l’Obélisque. Finally, I also make use of news reports, blog posts, and television images, 
which were mainly acquired from the independent news channel Walf TV. 
3 Civil society (la société civile) as the concept is used in Senegalese political discourse - and here - 
refers to NGOs such as human rights organizations, women’s organizations, development 
organizations etc. 
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will be compared. By doing so, I will challenge the view that the 2011-2012 electoral protests 
constitute an active révolution citoyenne, and argue that the objectives of key actors raise 
questions on the ability of the protests to bring about deeper democratic change. 
 
In the following section I first give a more detailed overview of events in the run-up to the 
presidential elections of 2012 in Senegal. The subsequent section examines factors that have 
been raised by other authors to explain successful protest mobilization, in particular economic 
and political grievances at the population level. Then, I will turn to my analysis of the electoral 
protests which emphasizes movement capacities and underlying social networks. These will 
also be contextualized within the Senegalese political field. In the conclusion, I evaluate the 
results with regard to current knowledge on protest mobilization in (Sub-Saharan) Africa. 
 
2. Electoral protests in Senegal: An overview of events 4 
On the 16th of June 2011 President Wade’s Council of Ministers adopted a law proposal that 
would change prevailing rules regarding the presidential elections to be held in February 2012. 
The most important changes were the direct election of the President together with a vice-
president, and the introduction of a 25% voting majority (instead of 50%) to win the elections 
in the first round. The election of a vice-president together with the president seemed to be put 
in place to the benefit of Wade’s son Karim and raised accusations of a dévolution 
monarchique, while the 25% rule would clearly benefit the incumbent president (see the first 
round voting results below). 
 
The day before the vote in the National Assembly, the 22nd of June 2011, several protests 
already took place in Dakar, some of them running together with vandalism and tyre-burning. 
However, the largest, yet authorized, protests took place on the day of the vote, the 23rd of 
June, in Dakar and elsewhere in the country. Manifestations were led by political opposition 
parties and civil society organisations such as the Y’en a Marre movement5 and the Rencontre 
Africaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO). Some protests were characterized 
by low-intensity violence such as rock throwing, and police forces used tear gas and made 
several arrests. The law proposal was subsequently withdrawn. The events of the 23rd led to 
the creation of the Mouvement 23 (M23), a coalition of opposition parties and civil society 
                                               
4 The information provided here is generally uncontested and can be retraced to newspaper articles 
(e.g. Le Soleil), academic papers (e.g. Resnick, 2013), and the interview material used for this paper. 
5 The Y’en a Marre movement is sometimes translated as ‘Fed Up’ in English news articles. 
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groups with the common goal to work for the departure of the president. The movement 
organized manifestations against Wade’s plans to run for a third term in office and tried to build 
support for this goal by, among others, convening with religious leaders. 
 
Things started to heat up again when the Constitutional Court –appointed by the president 
(Resnick, 2013, p.631) - approved the legality of Wade’s candidacy for presidency on the 27th 
of January 2012. Numerous protests for the withdrawal of Wade, organized by the M23, took 
place between this date and the first round of the presidential elections on February 26th 2012. 
Several protests turned violent with at least four deaths6 - nine according to Resnick (2013)7. 
Protests raised domestic concern with several prominent religious or intellectual leaders calling 
for peace, while international actors such as the US, France, the European Union and the 
African Union made several calls for stability as well. The first round of voting, however, took 
place in relative calm. Abdoulaye Wade (34, 82%) and Macky Sall (26, 57%) went through to 
the second round of voting on the 25th of March. The month of March passed by without major 
disturbances. The second round of elections was won by Macky Sall with 65,8% of the votes. 
 
In the next section, I focus on possible protest motivations that have already been raised in 
the literature. This mainly concerns the grievances that have accumulated against the 
presidency of Abdoulaye Wade since his coming to power in 2000. 
 
3. The Waning Popularity of the Wade Regime 
When Abdoulaye Wade, the unrelenting opposition leader and presidential candidate of the 
PDS (Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise), defeated Abdou Diouf of the long-reigning Parti 
Socialiste (PS) in the second round of the elections in 2000, this Alternance was widely 
                                               
6 This death toll is based on news reports in the Senegalese newspaper Le Soleil (the only journal with 
an archive available online). Le Soleil is perceived as close to the government but this number is also 
concurred by La Gazette du Pays et du Monde (9-16 February): 1 student (Mamadou Diop), 1 police 
officer (Fodé Ndiaye), and 2 civilians killed by police gunfire in northern Podor – unfortunate accidents 
according to officials. More deaths after this date seem unlikely. 
7 In comparative perspective, Senegal is not among the African countries that are in recent times most 
at risk of severe electoral violence (see Straus & Taylor, 2012). It does, however, witness forms of 
violent harassment. The most serious case of election violence occurred in 1993 when the vice-
president of the Constitutional Council, Babacar Sèye was assassinated after the presidential 
elections, and before the publishing of results (Villalón, 1994, pp. 189-190). 
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heralded as a victory for democracy in Senegal. It did not take long, however, before critical 
voices started to point out increasing authoritarian and clientelistic tendencies in Wade’s rule 
(Dahou & Foucher, 2004; Galvan, 2001, p.56, Mbow, 2008). Notable issues raised were press 
censorship and threats against journalists, ousting of former coalition parties, a weak justice 
system, regular changes of the prime minister, and a strengthening of the position of the 
president. For example, although a constitutional referendum of 2001 did reduce the 
presidential term from 7 to 5 years, the 7-year term was reinstalled in 2008, in one of the many 
rounds of constitutional revisions during Wade’s 12 years in power (see e.g. AfriMAP/OSIWA, 
2012, pp. 49-65). These evolutions were also reflected by the change in the Freedom House 
score from “Free” to “Partly Free” in 2009 (Freedom House, 2014), and the lowering of the 
Polity IV regime type score from 8 to 7 in 2008 (Polity IV, 2014).8 
 
Although cracks in the regime were visible, the Wade government could still rely on goodwill 
because of the favourable economic situation (Dahou & Foucher, 2004). Indeed, in the 
presidential elections of 2007, Wade was re-elected with an absolute majority of the votes 
(55.9%) in the first round. Notwithstanding accusations of hasty elections (Mbow, 2008, p. 165) 
and electoral fraud, Osei (2011, pp.185-186) argues that Wade’s re-election can for the most 
part be attributed to his popularity. For example, data from the Afrobarometer9 Round 3, 
conducted in 2005, show that the presidency was the most trusted political institution, with 59,2 
percent of respondents stating they trust the presidency “a lot”, and only 10,9 % stating “not at 
all” (Osei, 2011, pp. 206-207).  
 
Notably, in the Afrobarometer Round 4, conducted in May/June 2008, the percentage of 
respondents that trust the president “a lot” had dropped to 30,27%, and the percentage that 
trusts the president “not at all” has risen to 33,70%.10 During his second term, the Wade regime 
did run into considerable difficulties. The economic situation deteriorated, which was 
highlighted by urban (youth) unemployment and clandestine migration, compounded by rising 
food and petrol prices since the global food price spike of 2007-2008 (Resnick, 2013). 
Moreover, the population was confronted with numerous electricity cuts, and, particularly in 
                                               
8 In 2013, the Freedom House score changed to “Free” again, the Polity IV score remains unchanged. 
9 Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political, 
and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in multiple African 
countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. All data are available online via 
www.afrobarometer.org. 
10 Following Osei (2011), I exclude missing cases and refusals, but include the ‘don’t know’ category. 
The two percentages do not differ significantly from each other. 
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Dakar, recurrent flooding of the banlieues. While the population faced these challenges, Wade 
also made the controversial decision to build the Monument de la Renaissance Africaine in 
Dakar with an approximated cost of 28 million dollars.  
 
Several of these issues already led to protest mobilization. For example, rising food prices led 
to protests in March and April 2008 (Antil, 2010) and the inauguration of the Renaissance 
monument led to protest in 2010 (Al Jazeera, April 3 2010). Furthermore, electricity cuts led to 
rioting and vandalism against offices of the state-owned electricity company Senelec in Dakar 
and other areas in October 2008 (Antil, 2010) and on the 27th of June 2011 (Le Soleil, June 28 
2011). These latter protests are also commonly seen as connected to the June 23 protests 
against Wade’s law proposal. 
 
Meanwhile, resistance at the political level developed further. When Wade ousted his prime 
minister Idrissa Seck in 2004, the latter –after a detention period due to accusations of 
corruption – started his own party “Rewmi” in 2006 (Mbow, 2008, p.164; Resnick, 2013, p. 
631). Subsequent prime minister Macky Sall left the PDS due to a clash with Wade in 2008 
and formed the Alliance pour la République (APR) (Kelly, 2012, p.125; Resnick, 2013, p.631). 
Moreover, after Wade’s victory in the 2007 presidential elections, a coalition of opposition 
parties, including the PS, the Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP), and former left-wing 
partners of Wade in 2000, boycotted the legislative elections several months later. This “Front 
Siggil Senegaal” (Front to Save Senegal) also joined the Assises Nationales in 2008, a national 
conference to discuss necessary reforms to overcome the country’s pressing societal 
challenges. Although invited, the PDS did not take part in the conference. Front Siggil Senegal 
developed further into “Bennoo Siggil Senegaal” (United to Boost Senegal) with the addition 
of new partners (Kelly, 2012, pp.126-127; Resnick, 2013, pp. 631-632). This coalition defeated 
the PDS in most major urban areas in the local elections of 2009.  
 
Gellar (2013) also notes a spectacular rise in citizen movements under the Wade regime and 
argues that these have been crucial for democratic consolidation in Senegal. These 
movements generally advocate greater citoyenneté in Senegal, including political and 
economic reform. Some new formations included the Mouvement Citoyen of Penda Mbow, 
“Bes Du Ñak”/Mouvement citoyen pour la Refondation Nationale (Mansour Sy Djamil), “Fekke 
Ma Ci Boole” of Youssou Ndour, and “Yamalé” (Bara Tall). Several movement founders also 
went into politics and made bids for the presidency in 2012. Well-known are also the more 
grass roots initiatives of the Collectif des Imams et Résidents de Guédiawaye and Y’en a 
Marre, formed by rappers in Dakar and particularly popular among urban youth.  
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According to Gellar, these movements stand proof of a growing internalization of democratic 
culture in Senegal, which was crucial for the protests against Wade. This viewpoint can be 
supported with research from Bratton (2013), who finds that between the 2002 and 2008 
Afrobarometer Rounds, the percentage of Senegalese preferring democracy over other kinds 
of government increased, whereas the percentage of Senegalese who are satisfied with the 
extent of democracy in their country declined. Several movements, however, emerged 
primarily focusing on economic issues. The Collectif des Imams, for example, is mainly 
concerned with rising (electricity) prices, power shortages, and flooding, while Y’en a Marre 
started out as a movement against electricity cuts and rising food prices, before advocating a 
more civic Nouveau Type de Sénégalais (NTS). This nuances the somewhat artificial boundary 
between economic and political grievances. 
 
There was ample evidence of the waning popularity of the Wade regime, especially during his 
second term. Participation in the electoral protests can therefore broadly be explained by the 
economic as well as political grievances that accumulated among the population of Senegal 
during that time. Clearly, malgovernance and Senegal’s slow growth were key issues in the 
presidential elections themselves with electoral promises focusing on youth employment, food 
prices, electricity provision, and so on (see e.g. Le Soleil, 23 March 2012). Moreover, the 
Mouvement 23 primarily based its campaigns on democratic values and citizenship. The 
following section, however, will bring to attention the organizational and financial resources 
necessary to stage protests, indicating that grievances as such cannot sufficiently explain 
movement success. 
 
4. Organizing a Revolution: Strategy, Blueprints, and Performances 
The section is structured as follows: Firstly, I analyze the start of the movement and events on 
the 23rd of June 2011. Secondly, I look at movement activities between the 23rd of June until 
the validation of Wade’s candidature and the start of the election campaigns. Then I analyze 
the election period itself, followed by the aftermath, including the M23 today. 
 
4.1. “Touche pas à ma Constitution” and the 23rd of June 2011 
 
The law proposal introduced by Abdoulaye Wade included two controversial changes. The first 
was the direct election of the president with a vice-president, similar to the American system. 
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Although quickly used by the opposition to accuse Wade of preparing his son as his successor, 
it has to be said that the position of vice-president was already created in the constitution in 
2009, when it had led to little controversy. The argument that a direct election of the vice-
president constituted democratic progress could therefore still be held. The second 
controversial proposition, namely electing the president with just more than 25% of the votes 
in the first round, could only be defended with difficulty. According to PDS interviewees, even 
many of Wade’s ministers and members of parliament struggled with the proposition and found 
the idea a strategic error as it would indicate that the ruling party itself was no longer sure of a 
victory in 2012. Just before the closing of parliament, the law proposal was sent to the 
assembly to be considered under procedure of urgency. The ECOWAS Protocol on Good 
Governance prohibits substantive changes to electoral rules 6 months before an election, and 
the reopening of parliament was only planned for October.  
 
When word broke out of the law proposal via Senegal’s largely independent press, Alioune 
Tine, the head of the Rencontre Africaine de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (RADDHO) 
gathered prominent civil society members to oppose the proposal together. This led to the 
initiative Touche pas à ma Constitution, brought together a week before the vote in the National 
Assembly. The participants started attacking the proposal, mainly via press declarations. Each 
member also made contact with other civil society networks: business associations, labour 
unions, youth and women movements and so on, to meet up and discuss further actions. The 
steering committee also met with leaders of the opposition coalition “Bennoo Siggil Senegaal” 
(BSS) to put up a joint initiative. These were not represented in the National Assembly because 
of the legislative boycott in 2007.  
 
It is important to note the pre-existing ties that existed between these actors. Civil society 
movements often cooperate on projects and their members know each other relatively well, at 
least in Dakar. They are also represented in umbrella organisations or networks such as the 
CASC (cadre de Concertation et d’Action de la Société Civile). There was some prior 
agreement between members of this latter network that Wade’s repeated changes of the 
constitution had to be stopped and that former attempts had failed because opposition was too 
fragmented. Connections with opposition parties were particularly formed by the experience of 
the Assises Nationales and many interviewees estimated that about 90% of the members of 
the Assises later also took part in the M23. 
 
Of course, opposition parties set up actions of their own to decry the President’s electoral 
proposal. Political youth movements in particular opted for a well-known medium for 
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awareness-raising, namely instigating riots in the city. On the 20th of June, for example, political 
youths created a disturbance by blocking roads at the busy Sandaga market of Dakar: « il 
fallait coûte que coûte réussir le coup, et le coup ce n’était pas s’opposer à la police, ça nous 
intéressait pas, le coup était de se faire arrêter, de créer un scandale pour que le monde entier 
sache que Abdoulaye Wade est en train de faire des choses qui sont anti-démocratiques au 
Sénégal » (political youth). A generational clash is visible in these actions. On the 22nd of June, 
a meeting between civil society actors and politicians took place near the Place de 
l’Indépendance in Dakar. Whereas most prominent figures saw the meeting as an assembly 
to make arrangements for the following day, many youths, from political parties as well as civil 
society (notably the Y’en a Marre movement) chose instead to take protesting to the streets: 
« il y avait une forte mobilisation des jeunes, nous avons parlé aux jeunes que ces leaders-là, 
ce qu’ils voulaient faire ici, ce qu’ils faisaient au salon de Dansokho (Note : coalition gatherings 
often took place in the house of BSS leader Amath Dansokho), qu’il faudrait qu’on arrête 
l’Assemblée Générale, qu’on les pousse à descendre avec nous […] il y avait une forte 
présence de la presse et c’est ainsi que les populations de Sénégal ont été donc informé » 
(civil society/political youth11). These sorts of ‘violent performances’ continued to play a part in 
the actions of the M23, and will be further discussed below. 
 
The manifestation of the 23rd itself became a great success, and many would refer to it as a 
historical mobilization of the Senegalese people. Le Monde (2011) recounts estimates ranging 
from one thousand to several thousand protesters at the Place Soweto. The M23 would later 
cite – probably exaggerating- hundreds of thousands of protesters across the whole of Senegal 
(internal document meant as press declaration, 28 June 2011). The opposition manifestation 
as well as a less successful PDS manifestation took place at the Place Soweto directly before 
the National Assembly, which was an unusual, and perhaps daring, choice by PDS officials. 
Protests indeed degenerated into violence12, notably characterized by rock-throwing. 
Escalation might have been purposeful as the Place Soweto is quite deprived of rocks to throw 
and several, especially young, protesters arrived on the scene carrying stones. Police 
responded with tear gas and clashes went on into the city until the afternoon. 
 
                                               
11 Membership of civil society movements and membership of political parties are not often mutually 
exclusive. 
12 Discussions on who started the violence are manifold. Most state that PDS-minister Farba Senghor 
provoked protesting youths who then started throwing rocks. Others insist that the youths who started 
the violence were hired “provocateurs” of the PDS.  
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Already on the 23rd, preparations and coordinating efforts were deemed necessary. To steer 
the manifestation in the right direction, the members of Touche pas à ma Constitution split up 
in three groups: one group protested at Place Soweto, one stayed at the headquarters of 
RADDHO, and one group travelled in-between to transport food, water, and wounded. When 
violence broke out, the group at RADDHO took on a coordinating and information-sharing role 
indicating where police forces were present, where tyres had to be burned to block roads etc. 
Meanwhile, party youths as well as members of Y’en a Marre undertook various actions 
elsewhere in Dakar. One political representative noted rather proud that his militants had 
vandalized PDS-members houses during the protests to give a clear sign to Abdoulaye Wade 
(see also Le Soleil, 24 June 2011). 
 
In the end, it can be said that pressure of the street led President Wade to withdraw the law 
proposal. However, according to PDS representatives, the president had already abandoned 
both the direct election of the president with a vice-president, and the 25% proposition following 
the advice of his MPs. Therefore the situation could have been similar to the one of Nigerian 
President Obasanjo, whose extension of term limit was denied by his Senate (Posner & Young, 
2007). 
4.2. The M23: build-up of a protest movement 
 
After the success of the 23rd, most protest organizers decided to continue the campaign as 
the Mouvement 23, now against Wade’s possible candidacy13. The name M23 came from 
Macky Sall, who judged that Mouvement des Forces Vives de la Nation de 23 Juin, based on 
the Guinean example, was slightly too long14. As I will demonstrate, during this phase, the 
movement relied to a large extent on political party blueprints for organizing manifestations, as 
well as political financial and human resources. At this point, several civil society organizations 
also opted out of the movement. A notable example is Forum Civil, the Senegalese branch of 
Transparency International, which lost some members to the M23 because of this decision. 
 
Whereas preparations for the 23rd were conducted rather hastily, the M23 now formed a 
permanent structure with a general assembly, a coordination committee, secretariat and 
                                               
13 The presidential term had been limited to 2 mandates in the constitutional referendum of 2001. As 
Abdoulaye Wade had come to power according to the rules of the previous constitution, he argued 
that he was still allowed to run for a third mandate because of the non-retroactivity principle. 
14 The Congolese rebel group that goes by the same name was not yet formed at the time. 
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various commissions (finance, organisation and mobilization, diaspora…). Particularly 
important was the creation of departmental cells throughout the national territory: “donc ça 
donnait l’impression que -, mais c’est dans tout le pays qu’il y a eu ça” (party member 1) ; « si 
c’est Dakar seulement, le régime (…) peut dire, bon, ça c’est pas grave, […] mais quand il y a 
quelque chose à Dakar, Thiès etc, c’est une pression plus grande.» (party member 2). Finding 
local contacts in all regions of Senegal was no easy task, however, and not always successful 
as can be derived from constant calls to establish and ‘revive’ committees in internal 
documents. To establish departmental committees it seems that the movement relied to a large 
extent on membership contacts provided by the opposition parties of BSS. Although denied by 
some interviewees, one meeting summary states: “travailler si possible avec fichier des 
comités départementaux établi par BSS” (internal document, 16 January 2011). Lists of 
departmental activists also contain for the large majority political party representatives (internal 
document, 21 December 2011). Local cells were also supported with financial means: « Oui, 
et maintenant pour l’argent, […] aux structures locales, qui étaient franchement dans des 
conditions d’organiser la manifestation. Ça c’était pour éviter de jeter de l’argent. » (party 
member 1). « […] si on ait une vingtaine de personnes, une dizaine de personnes, on ne peut 
pas faire une marche qui réussisse comme telle et on peut peut-être aller déposer à la 
préfecture une motion de protestation » (party member 3). 
 
To acquire the necessary financial resources, the M23 relied on monthly contributions. 
Repeated calls for contributions indicate that this was not the most stable source of income 
and indeed, for the organization of manifestations many admit that political leaders covered 
the large majority of expenses, especially the ‘big four’: Macky Sall (APR), Moustapha Niasse 
(AFP), Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS) and Idrissa Seck (Rewmi). One important expense is the 
direct transmission of a manifestation on television, with figures ranging from 4000$ to 17000$: 
« Tout ça, c’est une stratégie (…) en place pour d’abord informer l’opinion et les Sénégalais 
pour que les gens partagent le combat » (civil society member 1). Other expenses can be 
viewed from the following proposition for a protest march in Dakar15 (1000 CFA equals 
approximately 1,75 $): 
  
                                               
15 Whether the proposition was approved or not is not known, but this can be doubted as the 
document itself states that ambitions might have to be tempered due to resource constraints. Other 
manifestations have been estimated at 2 394 000 CFA (internal document, 17 October 2011) and 20 
000 000 CFA (civil society member 4). 
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Table 1: Budget Proposition of the M23 Organisation Commission  
Transport :  
Département de Dakar : 1500 Cars x 12 000                  = 18 000 000 
Département de Guédiawaye : 500 Cars x 
15 000    
=     7 500 000 
Département de Pikine : 1000 Cars x 15 000             =   15 000 000 
Département de Rufisque : 500 Cars x 25 000          = 12 500 000 
3 000 Cars x 35 = 105 000 Personnes.  
Report =   55 000 000 F 
Tee Shirts à 1000 ?      10 000 x 1 000   =   10 000 000 
Sono                                                        =     1 000 000     
Location Camion =     1 000 000 
Support : Affiche, sensibilisation             
Report   =   67 300 000F  (approximately 
115.000$) 
Source: internal document (31 October 2011). 
 
This budget proposition reveals that M23 manifestations were largely based on political party 
blueprints on ‘how to organize a successful manifestation’, as for parties this is an important 
instrument to compare relative strength, which is crucial in coalition formation. For example, 
although some civil society members defend the image that all protesters gathered 
spontaneously and by their own means, it is clear that a lot of logistic efforts had to be 
undertaken to organize transport. As with political meetings, this is done by hiring cars rapides 
to vehicle militants and sympathisers from the banlieues (Guédiawaye, Pikine, Rufisque) and 
elsewhere to the meeting grounds (Dakar centre), which necessitates a strong organizational 
presence in local neighbourhoods, and budgetary decentralization. 
 
The form of the manifestations also reveals common political practice. It is always deemed 
necessary to hire animation (e.g. musicians, rappers) to make participation more attractive to 
the general public and sound installations and podiums have to be provided – usually by the 
larger political parties. Speeches by political leaders similarly always take place (although 
speech times led to quite some internal struggles within the M23). From a mobilizing 
perspective, the participation of party leaders is regarded as crucial: “[la stratégie] permet de 
motiver les militants et manifestants qui seront certainement ravis d’apprendre que leur leaders 
sont les premiers sur la place” (internal document, 15 February 2012). 
 
Typical instruments of mobilization clientelism in Senegal are also the provision of food and 
water (as on the 23rd of June), and of T-shirts, hats, and other party paraphernalia. These 
instruments were also widely made use of by the M23. In the beginning, the M23 prohibited 
signs of party affiliation, yet this was not always implemented successfully, and many party 
colours as well as banners could be seen on M23 manifestations (see also Cissé A., 2012; 
Marro, 2012). Ultimately, it seems that civil society members of the M23 had to eventually give 
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up on the idea of party neutrality to safeguard the success of manifestations: “les partis et 
coalitions peuvent permettre à leurs militants d’enfiler des T-shirts à leurs couleurs” (internal 
document, 15 February 2012, yet – based on interviews - this was likely already decided 
around October). 
 
A poignant example is the M23 manifestation of the 23rd of September 2011, which had the 
goal to give ‘la parole au peuple’ by inviting different socio-professional organizations to 
speech. Many see the organization of the event as proof of successful civil society mobilization. 
For example, Gellar (2013, p. 136) notes: “at a mass meeting in September 2011 […], the 
leaders of Y’en a Marre determined which political leaders and party representatives were 
allowed to speak and how much time they had to present their message.” In reality, however, 
speech times are largely agreed upon beforehand and the role of Y’en a Marre as moderator 
reflected the goal of politically non-aligned organizers to bring civil society more to the 
foreground, as opposed to political parties. One party representative, however, argued that the 
help of parties was asked at the last minute because fears had arisen that the manifestation 
would be unsuccessful. More importantly, he also showed convincing communications 
demonstrating that political parties had actually contacted the different organizations (the 
handicapped, teachers, veterans etc) present that day and planned the podium programme of 
the event. Furthermore, in comparison to previous events of the M23, the number of 
participants was rather low – hundreds not thousands – and the idea of a failure was even 
raised (Cissé F., 24 September 2011; RFI, 24 September 2011). 
 
The practicalities of protest organizing are usually left in the hands of political youth 
movements16. They set up podia and sound installations, safety grills, and organize security 
for their leaders. Moreover, they are also seen as ‘protest specialists’, who take the lead in 
marches, prepare and synchronize slogans, and indicate for example whether to applaud or 
boo deputies entering parliament on the 23rd. Another task left for youths is to engage in ‘low-
intensity’ violent actions to attract media attention and keep the idea of a political battle alive. 
“Non, ça [seulement des manifestations paisibles] n’aura pas eu un effet. (…) le pouvoir dirait 
« oh laissez manifester et après ». Mais quand (…) on a commencé à voir tous les jours, toutes 
les nuits des manifestations avec des pneus qui brûlaient et que les télévisions du monde 
entier commençaient à montrer ça et que la communauté internationale a commencé à 
s’intéresser aux troubles au Sénégal. » (civil society member 2). Therefore burning tyres on 
                                               
16 When asked, interviewees mostly define youths as between 16 and 35 year olds. Political youth 
movements often implement a 35 years age limit. Men are largely in the majority. 
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strategic traffic locations in Dakar17, throwing rocks at police forces on arrival –which, 
according to their own standard operating procedures, use tear gas to disperse protesters- 
and further clashes with police officers are not to be seen as spontaneous outbursts of 
violence. On the contrary, actors are quite aware of the effect of these actions on Western 
media and plan their actions carefully: « c’était une stratégie mise en place que les jeunes 
exécutaient par quartier, chaque groupe prenait un quartier, quelques fois ils ont besoin d’un 
peu d’argent pour acheter d’essence pour brûler les pneus, on leur donnait ça » (civil society 
member 2). Overall, violence remained quite limited, weapons were rarely used by rioters, and 
mostly collected old tyres and wooden tables were burned. Therefore these actions seem to 
correspond more to ‘performances’ meant to create the image of widespread violence. 
 
However, as already noted, a generational clash was visible within the M23 with youths 
advocating more ‘revolutionary’ actions than adults. An often repeated example is that of 
youths shouting ‘on va au palais’ (multiple interviewees) during manifestations while political 
and civil society leaders dismissed such actions as irresponsible. Youths from both political 
parties as civil society also took the initiative to organize an M23 des jeunes to set up more 
autonomous actions. These actions were rooted in the recent past as political youths had long 
been frustrated by the passivity of their leaders and had undertook several opposition initiatives 
during Wade’s second term, for example against the creation of the post of vice-president in 
the constitution. There is also some evidence that political youths played an important role in 
the electricity riots of 2008 and 2011, e.g. « Mais ici le 27 juin il y a eu une coupure jamais 
égalée à Dakar, puisque le dispositif était déjà là, les gens ont balancé des sms, il fallait 
justement que quelqu’un a marre, c’est les jeunes du M23, bon pas les jeunes du M23, mais 
les jeunes de l’opposition qui ont démarré cette manifestation du 27 juin. Et ainsi de suite la 
banlieue a pris, les autres se sont organisés et c’était tout le monde qui manifestait. » (civil 
society/political youth). 
4.3. The M23 and the 2012 electoral campaigns 
 
When elections drew closer, the fragile coalition of civil society organizations and numerous 
political parties started to unravel. Furthermore, opposition parties themselves were far from 
united at this point with 9 presidential candidates in the M23 and a split within the BSS between 
                                               
17 For example, university students as well commonly bring their vindications to attention– often 
recurrent delays in the payment of scholarships - by blocking major traffic routes around de cité 
universitaire such as the Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop and the Corniche. 
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Moustapha Niasse and Ousmane Tanor Dieng (Benno ak Tanor). The major goal of the 
movement was thwarted by the ruling of the constitutional court to validate Wade’s 
candidature, which led to serious internal divisions on the next course of action. At first the 
plan arose to keep protesting until the candidacy was withdrawn:  “l’intention qu’on avait c’était 
d’occuper la Place d’Obélisque comme les Egyptiens ont occupé la Place Tahrir.” (civil society 
member 3). Yet protests would gradually diminish and the comparison with the Arab Spring 
would soon be found flawed (see also Châtelot, 2012). One reason was surely the continuous 
repression that took place after manifestations were prohibited and authorizations were no 
longer sought. For example, the day of the validation of Wade’s candidature, a young student 
(and, often left unmentioned, a PS militant), Mamadou Diop, was killed when he was hit by a 
police truck. He was soon heralded as a martyr of the revolution by the opposition - an 
interesting framing exercise in a case which is fogged by much uncertainty. The death of a 
police officer during this period, beaten to death by protesters or violent infiltrators18, is however 
commonly ignored. Besides repression, another reason for the declining success of the M23 
manifestations was the interference with the election campaigns of the opposition candidates.  
 
Initially, it seemed that the majority of the M23 had rallied behind the idea to do a boycott of 
the elections if Wade’s candidacy was not withdrawn (see e.g. Le Soleil, 6 February 2012)19. 
Some interviewees also cited civil society concerns that mobilization at the Place de 
l’Obélisque and the Place de l’Indépendance would fail if political parties went campaigning. 
Several opposition leaders, notably Macky Sall, were not entirely convinced, however. Since 
his departure from the PDS, he had travelled throughout Senegal to prepare for the elections 
and felt confident of the results. A few days after the validation of candidacies, Sall left Dakar 
to campaign in the rest of Senegal. He was quickly followed by Moustapha Niasse, Ousmane 
Tanor Dieng, and –to a lesser extent - Idrissa Seck. Smaller political parties, with no real 
chance of winning the presidency, stayed put and continued protesting. The consequences for 
the M23 were strongly felt. Manifestations became decreasingly successful: « Finalement, on 
s’est rendu compte que c’est Dakar qui bougeait, peut-être Mbour un peu, Thiès un peu, bon, 
mais c’est Dakar » (party member 3), and movement structures became quickly devoid of 
political party members: « Le secrétariat était vide […] juste avant la validation de la 
                                               
18Infiltrateurs are commonly mentioned regarding manifestations in Dakar. The term refers to criminals 
who make use of disruptions to steal, vandalize, but rarely murder. Sometimes clochards and other 
poor youths are actively recruited by protest organizers – in secret -to have more participants and 
power when things degenerate. 
19 More radical ideas proposed by youths were, for example, sabotaging the voting process and 
burning electoral material. 
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candidature, de la campagne électorale. En ce moment-là, les représentants des partis 
politiques avaient disparus, pratiquement. Et certaines personnalités de la société civile 
également avaient disparu. Donc dans le secrétariat, il n’y avait plus que deux personnes, de 
la société civile. »  (civil society member 4). 
 
When Macky Sall came out as the runner-up in the first round of the elections, all other 
opposition candidates rallied behind him for the second round20. A grand electoral coalition 
under the name Benno Bokk Yakaar (BBY) was formed uniting the opposition against Wade. 
At this time the locus of action shifted from the M23 headquarters to the BBY: « […] on était 
avec les partis politiques, on était en train de lutter pour un même idéal, c’est-à-dire, le départ 
de Wade. Mais, les partis politiques, après se sont retrouvés entre eux (…), ont commencé à 
réfléchir sur la plateforme BBY sans même informer la société civile. Donc, c’est  quand ils se 
sont trouvés d’accord que nous avons été mis au courant. » (civil society member 5). This 
rendered civil society members vulnerable to others’ accusations that they had been playing 
politicians’ game all along. Their efforts had not entirely been rendered obsolete, however. To 
increase his support, Sall promised to reduce the presidential mandate from 7 to 5 years after 
being elected. This had been a demand of many members of the Assises Nationales, in which 
Sall never played a prominent role. The month of March passed by without major 
manifestations and most efforts were invested in Sall’s campaign. 
4.4. Aftermath 
 
After Macky Sall won the elections and Wade peacefully left office, government and 
administrative positions were quickly taken up by members of the grand BBY coalition. 
However, not only political colleagues within the M23 were given positions, many former civil 
society members were co-opted within state institutions as well. Notable examples are 
Abdoulatif Coulibaly (critical reporter), Abdoul Aziz Tall (Yamalé), Alioune Tine (RADDHO), 
and Penda Mbow (Mouvement Citoyen). These re-alignments continue to stir debate within 
Senegalese society. For example, in February 2014, the newspaper L’Observateur (February 
24th 2014) still headlined: « La politique décime la société civile: reconversion des technocrates 
dans les sphères étatiques ». Concerns center on how former prominent civil society members 
                                               
20 This was presented as the natural path to follow, but in Senegalese coalition politics, returns to the 
ruling party are not entirely uncommon. For example, after first supporting Abdoulaye Wade in the first 
round of the 2000 elections, PS-defector Djibo Ka returned to Diouf in the second round after being 
promised the position of prime minister (Vengroff & Magala, 2001, p.139). Some interviewees indeed 
claimed that support was not immediate and needed prior agreements between parties. 
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are no longer heard of in the policy domain and strictly refrain from criticising the current 
regime. This also rekindles an old debate on the motives of civil society actors (e.g. 
AfriMAP/OSIWA, 2012, p. 75): are NGO’s simply a means of getting closer to power and is 
there, ultimately, a difference from politicians? 
 
After months of silence after the elections, the majority of the members of the M23 decided to 
continue the movement as an association. Some members did not join the association arguing 
that the M23 corresponds more to a general sentiment and does not need to be 
bureaucratized. Still others formed factions of their own and split off from the main M23. 
However, the M23 decided that a renewal of membership was not necessary, therefore 
everyone is technically still a member. This leads to the schizophrenic position that many 
members of government are also members of the M23 which plays primarily a watchdog role. 
Political actors have largely abandoned the M23, though. This could be seen from the 
celebration of 1 year of revolution on the 23rd of June 2012, which was quite sober. A second 
problem is that the M23 has accepted some 18.000$ from Macky Sall for their headquarters, 
which raises serious doubts concerning their neutrality. Finally, some argue that the M23 has 
now become just one of many NGOs focusing on corruption, economic development etc. 
4.5. Who mobilizes? Political Parties and Mobilization Capacities 
 
Narratives often play a major part in recounting and remembering social movement actions, in 
particular cycles of resistance (Polletta, 2006). This is also clearly visible in the Senegalese 
case. Interviewees commonly refer to the spontaneity of resistance, e.g. “les gens sont venus 
de leur propres moyens” (civil society member 5) or people came from “toutes les couches de 
la société” (multiple interviewees); and refer to the “conscience citoyenne émergente” (civil 
society member 6) or consistently speak of “la révolution citoyenne” (civil society/political 
youth).21 As mentioned, the celebration of Mamadou Diop as a martyr of the revolution also 
plays a major part in this narrative-making. Referring to people’s network connections -as in 
                                               
21 The latter interviewee also stated, however: « Mais les sénégalais qui étaient là-bas le 23 juin, il n’y 
avait pas cette culture de constitutionnalité. Ils étaient venus certains parce que c’était le chômage 
grandissant, ils étaient venus des autres parce que c’est les coupures d’électricité, d’autres étaient 
venus parce qu’ils avaient compris le sens du projet de loi, d’autres aussi ils étaient venus parce qu’ils 
se trouvaient pas dans la politique du gouvernement d’Abdoulaye Wade. » Indeed, for many protesters, 
it is likely that the deteriorating economic situation played a stronger role than constitutional concerns 
for deciding protest participation (see also Mueller, 2013). 
CRPD Working Paper No. 20 
20 
the case of Diop’s political militancy- is almost taboo in this. Unprovoked, interviewees often 
state things such as: « j’ai vu des collègues, ils n’ont jamais fait de la politique, mais ils se sont 
mobilisés » (party member 2) ; « […] qui n’ont jamais milité dans aucune organisation de la 
société civile ou aucun parti politique (…) qui sont venus spontanément. » (civil society 
member 7). These statements are likely to be correct, but they do ignore the networks and 
organizations taking the initiative to stage and plan protest actions in the first place. Indeed, 
further probing reveals numerous strategic actor decisions, for example to gather media 
attention, and elaborate organization and planning behind manifestations. Political parties 
played a major role in this. 
 
La société civile in Senegal is not known to have strong organizational capacities and seems 
mainly visible via charismatic leaders (see also AfriMAP/OSIWA, 2012, pp. 74-75). They 
generally do not stage demonstrations, but rely on declarations: “ça [Note: civil society 
declarations], c’est bon pour nous, on n’a pas un problème avec ça” (PDS representative). In 
addition, they usually work from limitedly staffed offices in the capital without strong 
connections with the rest of the country. When participating in manifestations, the practical 
functions are usually taken up by experienced party representatives. In the case of the M23 
many respondents state things such as: “ils ont du monde derrière” (civil society member 8), 
“les partis politiques, c’est la masse” (party member 1), and “la force de frappe” (civil society 
member 9), « la société civile, ils sont trop faible et (…) il faut des moyens humaines, il faut 
des moyens financiers, il faut une capacité de mobilisation » (civil society member 1).  
 
The comparative advantage of parties is by far their financial means and experience, as well 
as their presence on the ground in local political structures. To gather protesters in an 
underdeveloped context, transport, food and water, are crucial for success as forgoing the 
chance to gain a daily income must for many be compensated: “Si tu demandes un 
rassemblement, la plupart, ils te demandent le billet de transport” (party member 2). The role 
of new social media in uniting previously unconnected activists in Africa has been widely 
discussed, especially in the context of the Arab Spring (e.g. Allagui & Kuebler, 2011). Yet 
although calls were actively made via facebook, twitter, and online fora, evidence suggests 
that protest mobilization in Senegal mainly relied on established membership lists, known 
contacts, and telephone communications. Local contacts are then responsible for gathering 
protest support, for example by appealing to youth movements.22 This has also been found 
                                               
22 For example, the ‘Associations Sportives et Culturelles (ASC)’ in Senegal are commonly politicized. 
Politicians provide financial support to these youth movements, but expect participation in meetings 
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crucial to stage ‘nationwide’ protests in Senegal. It is revealing that the arguably most 
successful civilian mobilization by the Y’en a Marre movement strongly based itself on political 
mobilization strategies, primarily the building of local structures (esprits) in the capital and 
elsewhere in the country. 
 
These findings do not imply that protesters were only party militants. For example, political 
parties see their own role more as forming a solid base for successful protests: « si par 
exemple il y a eu 15.000 personnes à la Place de l’Obélisque, la moitié sont des militants des 
partis politiques (…) ça permet aussi aux autres de pouvoir sortir de chez eux » (political 
youth). The idea of free-riding clearly does not come to mind here, on the contrary having 
demonstrators already on location motivates others to join. Civil society organizations were 
also not obsolete in the protests. As stressed by both political parties and civil society 
members, the participation of civil society gave the necessary credibility and legitimacy to the 
opposition. For example, cooperation with civil society reinforces the image of a “citizen’s 
revolution”, whereas the participation of political parties alone would create the image of a 
purely political conflict, making it more difficult for outsiders to take position. 
 
Successful party mobilization can be related to the ongoing ‘passive revolution’ in Senegalese 
politics, which can also be seen, in this context, as an opening up of the political opportunity 
structure. Fatton’s (1987) ‘passive revolution’ refers to the gradual liberalization that took place 
under Senghor and Diouf without strong pressure from the street, and which transformed 
Senegal from a de facto one-party state to a multiparty democracy. The main goal of this 
democratization was to reinforce the hegemonic position of the PS by dividing the opposition. 
This pattern of gradual liberalization without consolidation has been maintained under Diouf 
(see e.g. Beck, 1997; Villalón, 1993). 
 
Several researchers have noted the flip side of this liberalization for the ruling party. In the long 
run, it encourages internal splits with defectors taking their own chances in the multiparty 
system, and it encourages opposition cooperation through a learning process (e.g. “repeated 
games”) (Mozaffar & Vengroff, 2002). For example, Galvan (2001, p. 54) sees the defections 
of Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse from the PS as crucial determinants of the political 
                                               
and manifestations in return. This is related to the political clout that is attached to the number of 
people one can gather.  
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alternation of 2000 (see also Mozaffar & Vengroff, 2002). These prominent PS figures saw 
their chances to the presidency reduced with Diouf remaining in power, and left the PS, taking 
their supporting factions with them. 
 
The parallel can be drawn with the departures of Idrissa Seck (Rewmi) and Macky Sall (APR) 
from the PDS (Kelly, 2012, p. 125; Resnick, 2013, p. 5). After exit, these prominent figures 
take their supporters with them causing considerable draining of ruling party members. 
Moreover, aided by their former positions in power (and gathered resources in these positions), 
they can become quite formidable political opponents. As opposed to the idea that many 
political parties in sub-Saharan Africa, especially opposition parties, are generally weak and 
unstructured (see e.g. Bogaards, 2013), the gradual breaking up of factions from the ruling 
parties has led to more effective political pluralism in Senegal. When these opposition parties 
cooperate, this can lead to, among others, successful protest mobilization. 
 
By engaging in protests, political actors follow their own objectives, however: “les partis 
politiques, ce que les intéressait c’était d’avoir un scrutin transparent, un fichier fiable qui 
pouvait leur permettre de gagner les élections » (party member 4). With Wade finishing his 
second term and his popularity declining, party leaders would want to resist a third term 
strongly, often spending more money outside the M23 without civil society knowing. When 
elections with Wade became inevitable, resources were quickly shifted to electoral campaigns. 
Smaller parties making the decision to stay in Dakar to protest and raise awareness were later 
also rewarded with positions within BBY. The M23 today, now an unnecessary vehicle for 
power attainment, is left aside. 
 
Many other actors in the networks behind manifestations seem to pursue personal goals rather 
than being motivated by broader political and economic grievances.  The position shifts of 
NGO actors have already been noted, but leaders of citizen movements as well quickly reveal 
political ambitions: « quand on va vers des élections, (…) il y a beaucoup des partis politiques 
qui naissent, beaucoup des mouvements qui naissent (...) Et plusieurs mouvements comme 
ça sont nés comme ça, parce que c’était l’horizon 2012, on allait vers des élections. » (political 
journalist), and citizen movements recurrently transform into new parties. Finally, political 
youths often wish to be rewarded with administrative positions, or use their ‘manifestation 
fame’ to climb party ranks. 
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5. Conclusion 
Although academic discussions on social movements in Africa certainly take place (e.g. de 
Waal & Ibreck, 2013), the literature remains to an important extent deprived of in-depth 
analyses on how movements in Africa are formed, how they structure themselves, what actions 
they undertake, and, ultimately, how they demise. Coalitions of opposition parties and civil 
society actors especially, are regularly formed in Africa. This type of mobilization also took 
place in Guinea (2009), Niger (2009-2010), and, more recently, Burkina Faso (2014), and all 
protests reacted to presidential controversies. It is striking that these movements have only be 
scantly discussed in African studies. This study therefore attempts to clear the path towards a 
deeper and more detailed analysis of protest organization in Africa, and an increased 
understanding of African social movements. 
 
The resource mobilization perspective on the M23 in Senegal brought to attention the 
practicalities of protesting – organizing transport, acquiring media interest etc – which reveal 
to what extent the movement had to rely on financial and human resources. These were mainly 
provided by political parties. This also demonstrates the intentionality behind the cycle of 
resistance in Senegal in the run-up to the elections. Indeed, nationwide protests are actively 
sought and staged (and financed). Local protests therefore do not solely depend on the level 
of grievances, but also of organizational strength on the ground. Furthermore, violence - 
usually of a low intensity - is used to attract media attention, both from national and 
international sources. With regards to the latter, actors seem to pick in quite ingeniously on 
Western assumptions of political instability and violence in ‘Africa’; whereas in reality the scale 
of conflict and violence in (Sub-Saharan) African countries diverges widely. 
 
The motivational dimension to explain mobilization success remains important, and democratic 
and economic grievances at the population level were also what rendered old and new 
opposition parties more popular. Political opportunity structures could also be identified as 
internal divisions and defections within the ruling party strengthened opposition forces, as well 
as their means for protesting. However, it is clear that grievances and opportunity structures - 
though in important ways connected to the resource mobilization argument -   do not solely 
account for mobilization. Mobilization requires a practical feasibility with actors and prior 
networks ultimately deciding to undertake organizational efforts and devote sufficient means 
to the movement goal. The key political actors involved in this largely follow their own 
objectives to reach power, whereas even leaders of citizen movements and civil society 
organisations seem to follow personal goals as they are co-opted by the state. They are also 
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the actors that make up the new regime after the presidential elections. These features of the 
mobilization of 2011-2012 in Senegal cast doubt on the ability of the protests to fundamentally 
change prevailing political and economic relations, as is entailed in the meaning of a 
‘revolution’. 
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